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Abstract
Applying Atkeson and Kehoe's (2000) dynamic model to the dynamic
Chamberlin−Heckscher−Ohlin approach, we examine the role of the timing of development
(e.g., the removal of trade barriers) as a determinant of trade patterns.
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Over the past several decades a vast literature has developed on the emergence
of intra-industry trade (i.e., two-way trade of similar products). Helpman’s
(1981) seminal integration of the monopolistic competition trade model into
the two-country by two-factor by two-good Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) framework
has been extended and made popular by Helpman and Krugman (1985). This
integration led to the widely-held belief that the HO and Chamberlinian mo-
nopolistic competition models are complementary in nature. Helpman (1981)
called it the ‘Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin’ (CHO) approach.
Based on the CHO approach, Helpman and Krugman (1985, p. 173) ad-
vanced the empirical hypothesis that, on average, the more similar two countries’
factor endowment ratios are, the larger the share of intra-industry trade within
their bilateral trade volume will be.1 However, since Helpman and Krugman’s
prediction depends on static analyses, diﬀerences in factor endowment ratios
are exogenously given and not well explained. In this note, by examining the
dynamic CHO model, we try to provide some theoretical background for this
hypothesis on trade patterns.2 Recently, Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) showed that
in a dynamic HO model, the timing of development (e.g., the removal of trade
barriers) aﬀects the path of a country’s development. Applying their dynamic
model to the CHO approach, we examine the role of the timing of development
as a determinant of trade patterns.
Section 2 provides the basic setup of the dynamic CHO model. Section 3
presents a trade-pattern proposition.
2 The Model
Consider a world economy consisting of a large number of small countries
that diﬀer only in the timing of their development. Some countries, the early
bloomers, reach their steady states before other countries, the late bloomers,
begin to develop. There are two types of commodities, diﬀerentiated products
(Good 1) and consumable capital (Good 2), which are produced using repro-
ducible capital, K, and a primary and time-invariant factor of production, L.
The consumable capital is produced under constant returns to scale technology
and we choose it as the numeraire.







˙ X = −ρX, (2)
where V is the quantity index for diﬀerentiated products, C2 is the consumption
of the consumable capital, and ρ is the rate of time preference. It will be assumed
1This hypothesis ﬁnds support in Helpman (1987) for the 1970s.
2Recently several studies have developed the dynamc HO model. See, Nishimura and
Shimomura (2002, 2005), Shimomura (1992, 1993, 2004).
1that U is homothetic and f is increasing in its arguments. Quantity index V







,σ > 1, (3)
where N is the total number of diﬀerentiated products, x(i) is the consumption of
the i-th variety of diﬀerentiated products, and σ is the elasticity of substitution
between varieties.
Solving the static expenditure minimizing problem, we can deﬁne the expen-
diture function as
e(P)ψ(u) ≡ (minPV + C2,s.t.,u = f [U(V,C2)]), (4)
where P is the price index for diﬀerentiated products and ψ(u) is the inverse







Assume that diﬀerentiated products are more capital-intensive than consum-
able capital. Diﬀerentiated products are produced by monopolistically com-
petitive ﬁrms under increasing returns technology, while consumable capital
is produced by competitive ﬁrms under constant returns technology. Assume
that each ﬁrm in the diﬀerentiated products sector has the homothetic total
cost function c1(w,r)φ(y), where y is the output level of each ﬁrm. There are
signiﬁcant economies of scale: φ(y)/y is decreasing over the relevant range of
output levels y. The marginal revenue will be equated to the marginal cost:
p[1 − (1/σ)] = c1(w,r)φ (y). Furthermore, free entry implies that price equals
average cost: p =
c
1(w,r)φ(y)
y . By combining these conditions, one can easily see





¯ yφ (¯ y)
φ(¯ y)
. (5)
The constraints on labor and capital within a country are
c1
w(w,r)φ(¯ y)n + c2
w(w,r)y2 = L, (6)
c
1
r(w,r)φ(¯ y)n + c
2
r(w,r)y2 = K, (7)
where n is the number of diﬀerentiated products produced in the country.




3This result depends crucially on homotheticity in production. See, Dixit and Norman
(1980, pp. 284–5).
2and we can obtain factor price functions w(ξp)a n dr(ξp). Utilizing these factor
price functions, the national income is shown as
r(ξp)K + w(ξp)L. (10)
The partial derivative of the national income is equal to the aggregate national
output of diﬀerentiated products:
n¯ y = ξr (ξp)K + ξw (ξp)L. (11)
From (10), we can obtain another condition for consumers:
˙ K = r(ξp)K + w(ξp)L − e[N
1/(1−σ)p]ψ(u). (12)
Each consumer maximizes (1) subject to both (2) and (12). Associated with
this problem is the Hamiltonian
H ≡ uX + λ[r(ξp)K + w(ξp)L − e(N1/(1−σ)p)ψ(u)] + δρX, (13)
where λ and δ are the shadow prices of K and X. The necessary conditions for
optimality are
0=u − λe(N1/(1−σ)p)ψ (u), (14)
˙ λ = −λr, (15)
˙ δ = ρδ − u. (16)
Letting Z ≡ λ/X and combining (2) and (15), we can obtain
˙ Z = Z[ρ − r(ξp)]. (17)
3 Trade between Early and Late Bloomers
In comparing the development of early and late bloomers, we ﬁrst solve for the
steady-state output and prices for early bloomers. Imagine, for simplicity, that
all but one of the countries start developing at the same time with the same
initial capital endowment. Assume also that the late bloomer is a small country,
so its behavior does not aﬀect the time path for the world price.
Clearly, in equilibrium, all the identical early blooming countries make the
same choices except in regard to the range of diﬀerentiated products that they
produce; hence, the equilibrium for this world economy is the same as one for
a single large country that does not trade.4 Using this equivalence, the world
resource constraints are the same as (6) and (7).
We denote the steady-state techniques of production for the early bloomers
by ¯ k1 and ¯ k2, where ¯ ki ≡ ci
w/ci
r. Note that in a steady state, the world economy
4See Atkeson and Kehoe (2000).
3will clearly produce some diﬀerentiated products. It will also produce consum-
able capital. Thus,
¯ k2 < ¯ k<¯ k1, (18)
where ¯ k ≡ K/L and (8) and (9) hold. These steady-state prices and quantities
are found as the solutions to the following equilibrium conditions:5
ρ = r(ξp), (19)
e[N1/(1−σ)p]ψ(u)=r(ξ¯ p)K + w(ξp)L, (20)
ξr (ξp)K + ξw (ξp)L = N¯ y, (21)
N1/(1−σ)e [N1/(1−σ)p]ψ(u)=N¯ y. (22)
These four equations determine four variables: u, p, N,a n dK. Since the factor
endowment ratio is identical among all early bloomers, there is no incentive for
Heckscher-Ohlin trade (i.e., exchange of diﬀerentiated products for consumable
capital). Still, since each country specializes in a diﬀerent range of diﬀerentiated
products, an incentive for intra-industry trade remains: all trade ﬂows between
early bloomers consist of two-way trade of diﬀerentiated products.
Now consider the small country starting the process of development late.
In particular, assume that the rest of the countries in the world have already
reached their steady states when this small country removes domestic distortions
that have kept its capital stock relatively low and, hence, kept the country poor.
The path of development for the late bloomer depends on the late bloomer’s
capital-labor ratio relative to the ratios in the cone of diversiﬁcation. This cone
can be described by means of a Lerner diagram as in Figure 1: each isoquant
describes the combinations of factor inputs that produce an output level 1/p
given the production function. The cone is deﬁned as the set of capital and
labor endowments with which the late bloomer produces both diﬀerentiated
products and consumable capital. The cone consists of the pairs of capital and
labor (K,L) such that the ratio k = K/L is in the interval [¯ k2,¯ k1]. When
the late bloomer’s factor endowments lie in this cone, the late bloomer’s factor
prices are equal to those of the early bloomers.
Notice from Figure 1 that if the late bloomer starts the process of develop-
ment with some k0 ∈ (0,¯ k2), then over time the country’s capital-labor ratio
converges to the point A at the edge of the steady-state cone of diversiﬁcation.
This process can be explained as follows: The late bloomer starts outside the
cone of diversiﬁcation and specializes in producing consumable capital. While
the late bloomer is outside this cone, it has a lower capital-labor ratio than
the early bloomers use in the production of consumable capital and, hence, a
higher rental rate on capital. Thus, the late bloomer accumulates capital un-
til its capital-labor ratio equals that used in the rest of the world to produce
consumable capital. With this ratio, the late bloomer’s rental rate on capital





















5fall to the steady-state rate prevailing in the rest of the world, consumers in the
late blooming country have no further incentive to accumulate capital, and the
country’s growth stops at the lower edge of the cone of diversiﬁcation.
The capital-labor ratio ¯ k2 is strictly less than that of the early bloomers, ¯ k.
Although factor prices are equalized between early and late bloomers, diﬀerences
in factor endowment ratios remain in the steady state: the late bloomer never
produces diﬀerentiated products (i.e., the capital-intensive good) and, instead,
imports them in exchange for consumable capital.6
Proposition 1: While trade between early and late bloomers is inter-industry
trade, trade within early bloomers is intra-industry trade.
Applying Atkeson and Kehoe’s (2000) dynamic multi-country model to the
CHO framework, we emphasize the role of the timing of development (e.g., the
removal of trade barriers) as a determinant of trade patterns. Although our
result depends critically on several restrictive assumptions, it establishes a link
between the workhorse model of monopolistic competition and the timing of
development. Hopefully this analysis provides a useful paradigm for considering
how the timing of developent works as a determinant of intra-industry trade.
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